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The last decade has been a period of stock-taking and new adventures for 
Chinese policies regarding science and technology. After the new leader- 
ship had established itself in the late 1970s, and it looked back on the 
achievements and the mistakes of previous years, there was a strong feel- 
ing of frustration with the fact that levels of technology in China continued 
to lag behind advanced countries. To inject vitality into what seemed to be 
a dormant, but potentially powerful, science and technology (S&T) system 
required reforms which, in many respects, were more radical than any- 
thing of the past. 
We have witnessed a process where the results of research appeared for 
sale on a market, where scientists became engaged as ))moonlightingcc con- 
sultants, and where private research units have become fashionable. At 
the same time, however, these reforms have provided fascinating insights 
into the structural barriers which exist for technological innovation in 
modern Chinese society. In many respects, the exposure of such barriers 
provides crucial clues to the formulation of better S&T policies in China. 
With this paper we hope to contribute to a critical assessment of the re- 
forms. We are concerned with the political support of the S&T policy re- 
forms. The S&T system established after 1949 on the basis of a Soviet 
model appears to have recovered quickly after the alledgedly shattering 
onslaughts of ideological anti-intellectualism during the Cultural Revolu- 
tion. The scientists had barely drawn a sigh of relief before new, ))market- 
orientedc forces were let loose on them in the 1980s. The final years of the 
decade have brought about a stalemate between the push for commerciali- 
zation and the resistence to change. Who were the main proponents of the 
noldtr system, and who were politically motivated to develop the new ap- 
proaches? We shall provide a brief analysis of competing models in the po- 
litics of science and technology management which we hope will clarify 
these questions. 
Our main concern is, however, an attempt to gauge the actual impact of 
the reforms. We shall look at three areas where commercialization was 
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supposed to generate dynamism. First, the breaking the ))iron rice bowl(( of 
research funding was intended to achieve a more efficient and productive 
allocation of money. Secondly, people were to be relieved of the shackles 
of centrally managed assignment to permanent posts. With opportunities 
to move into new jobs scientists were expected to make full use of their ta- 
lents. Thirdly, technology-based entrepreneurship was promoted as a 
new means of diffusion. The emergence of a large number of collectively 
owned or private high technology ventures in the vicinity of institutions of 
higher education and research raised many controversial issues of how far 
commercialization should go. 
The Politics of Science and Technology 
It is notoriously difficult to analyze the role of different political views con- 
cerning S&T in China, and to identify concretely the personalities or politi- 
cal factions that are supporters of such views. Throughout the history of 
the PRC, issues related to S&T priorities have been intimately connected 
with national defence or economic security, which are guarded by secrecy 
in the interests of the state. In addition the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) has traditionally maintained a strong reluctance towards conduct- 
ing policy discussions in public. Consequently, most new policy initiatives 
are announced as directives rather than as proposals open to debate. 
We propose, however, that there have been two major themes in S&T 
policy debates in China - themes that have been characterized by rather 
different concerns and modes of political action. The main theme during 
much of the history of the PRC has been the status of scientists as an in- 
tellectual elite and their ideological consciousness. The other theme deals 
with the management of science and technology, centering on the 
processes of decision-making and the implementation of concrete priori- 
ties. 
Ideological Consciousness 
The theme of ideological consciousness was largely dictated by a rather ab- 
stract concept of proletarian science and the allegiance of Chinese scien- 
tists to the current priorities of the Chinese Communist Party. This theme 
dominated political debate up until the 1980s, forming rival camps of what 
we would designate ))ideologistscc and ))neutralists.((' 
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The ideologist camp, under the influence of Mao Zedong, stressed total 
allegiance to the party and Marxist-Leninist philosophy. During the Anti- 
Rightist Campaign of 1956, the Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Cul- 
tural Revolution, Mao Zedong took an active interest in the activities of 
China's scientists, which he had otherwise largely ignored. He and his fol- 
lowers required scientists to develop their ideological consciousness, to let 
the interests of the people dictate research priorities. The concrete policy 
implications of these ideas remained elusive, however, and the evidence 
which has been published since 1976 suggests that the main effect was a 
coercion of the vast majority of eminent scientists and an almost complete 
disruption of formal S&T activities. Only key projects of vital importance 
to national defence characteristically appeared to be shielded from the 
devastating activities of the Red Guards. 
The neutralist camp, we feel, can be characterized by the views ex- 
pressed by Deng Xiaoping, the dominant personality of the Post-Mao 
leadership, who believed that the results of science and technology were 
neutral. Accordingly, it did not matter whether ))the cat is black or white, 
as long as it catches mice,(( and the neutralist view was simply concerned 
with ensuring the production of results. During most of the first three de- 
cades after 1949 the neutralist approach dominated S&T policy and 
management, and China simply emulated the Soviet model. This in- 
cluded the expansion of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) into a 
central research organization and the establishment of a range of research 
units for individual sectors of the society. The Soviet model seemed well 
suited to mobilize S&T forces on sharply confined projects of national pri- 
ority, e.g., nuclear weapons, missiles, or hybrid rice. In fact, most major 
Chinese achievements have occurred in such projects. 
Zhou Enlai was the primary force behind the concrete formation of the 
neutralist S&T policy during the early years of the PRC. In taking this spe- 
cial interest in the utilization of intellectuals, and the planning and coordi- 
nation of civilian research, Zhou Enlai created a tradition for the State 
Council to occupy a key position in policy-making in this sector. Simul- 
taneously the defence sector was rapidly creating its own network of scien- 
tific and technological institutions, led by another influential ))grand old 
man(( of Chinese S&T politics, Nie Rongzhen. In this process the defence 
system (including space S&T) appears to have captured a lion's share of the 
financial resources and talented scientists, including famous overseas 
Chinese scientists such as Qian Xuesen who eventually returned to China. 
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Institutional Interests 
The second major theme has been concerned with efficiency in the 
management of science and technology, centering on the role of central- 
ized decision-making. Rival positions in the debate on this theme, which 
has dominated the 1980s, tend to be dictated by institutional interests. In 
the course of the 1980s, we suggest that three new positions have fought 
for influence; for convenience, we shall label these models cbureaucratic,(( 
ccscientistic,cc and ))economistic,c although the actual political interests of 
each view have been far more complex, and frequently overlapping, than 
what such labels imply. One should also note that these three new views 
emerged as transformations of the neutralist approach, while the ideolo- 
gist view has all but disappeared from the political scene. Ideologist 
rhetoric has, however, reemerged in the form of the ))Four Cardinal Princi- 
ples( lately, primarily for the purpose of weeding out opposition to the 
party's political rule and the priorities of the military-state complex. 
The bureaucratic model is thus based on the institutional interests of the 
military-state economic complex. In adopting the Soviet approach to insti- 
tution-building and planning of science and technology, China created an 
elaborate network of sectorial research academies and institutes serving 
the ministries of machine-building, which had major responsibilities for 
undertaking defence-related R&D.' During this period the Chinese also 
created a tradition of large projects pursued through a centralized plan- 
ning process. In addition to the two long-term plans for S&T development 
formulated in 1956 and 1978 respectively, and both of which were revised 
substantially due to shifting political priorities, the bureaucratic model has 
permeated the formulation and implementation of scientific and techno- 
logical projects under the five-year plan cycle.3 
In a way similar to its neutralistic precedent, the bureaucratic model has 
adhered to the belief that the research system formed a contingent of 
specialized ))workers(( which should - and could - make substantial contri- 
butions to China's socialist economic development, a belief that was en- 
dorsed in Deng Xiaoping's speech at the National Science Conference in 
March 1978. This speech is now seen as the turning-point in Chinese S&T 
p01icy.~ 
The speech marked a final showdown for the ideologists, but hardly 
touched upon the issue of effective management. Instead, the conference 
passed the ))Outline National Plan for the Development of Science and 
Technology 1978-1985 (draft).(( This document was conceptually tied up 
Copenhagen Papers 5.90 10 
Science and Technology Policy Reforms in China - A Critical Assessment 
with bureaucratic resurgence, and indeed directly linked to the ambitious 
10- year economic plan unveiled by Hua Guofeng. The plan proposed am- 
bitious targets and approved of 38 major science and technology projects 
in eight fields, such as agriculture, energy, raw materials, computer 
science, lasers, space, high energy physics and genetic engineering. The 
plan was very expensive and turned out to be difficult to implement with 
the limited human and financial resources available in China. In a manner 
typical for the bureaucratic approach, however, the prestigeous projects 
envisaged in the plan served to raise nationalist ambitions and attract in- 
ternational attention. The plan relied on the concepts and organizational 
characteristics of the Soviet model as incorporated in the Chinese S&T 
planning system developed during the first thirty years. 
At this stage Deng Xiaoping appears to have been a champion of the 
scientistic model too, as he supported the idea that scientists were inher- 
ently capable of conducting and disseminating useful research results, 
once they were left to decide their own priorities. This was a characteristic 
expression of the traditional views of the scientific community of China, 
and the rehabilitated scientists now began to lobby for larger financial 
resources for r e~ea rch .~  As a prominent example, the Chinese Academy 
of Sciences regained its original status as a centre of natural sciences, and 
was once again given control of many institutes which had been trans- 
ferred to the local government or simply dissolved during the Cultural 
Revolution. Similarly, the China Association for Science and Technology 
revived its activities in the area of science popularization and professional 
debates. The end of the 1970s thus led to the formation of a scientistic lobby 
which, initially at least, supported the existing Soviet-type S&T manage- 
ment system together with the military-state complex. 
The economistic model developed largely in response to the apparent 
failure of civil research and development, but also in reaction to the politi- 
cal influence of these lobbyist groups. With the support of technocrats 
which had recently gained more influence on the direction of research, 
this view posed the most serious challenge to the old system. At the na- 
tional level, these technocrats became more powerful at the State Science 
and Technology Commission (SSTC) which had been reestablished and 
provided with power to coordinate and set up comprehensive policies. 
This move was accompanied with several other organizational changes. 
For instance, provincial science and technology commissions were estab- 
lished to oversee the large number of local research institutes that had 
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been created since the 1950s. In this process, the priorities set up for the 
8-year plan by prominent scientists and their political lobbyists at the Com- 
munist Party appear to have been questioned. In the spirit of the new prag- 
matism after the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in De- 
cember 1978, it soon became an axiom that science should be directed by 
economic priorities. 
The economistic position emphasized new criteria for the management 
of research that were based on entrepreneurship at the lower levels of the 
S&T system. Their support base was erected on the philosophy of market- 
oriented reforms, which had been confirmed by new experiments with 
contract research. For Zhao Ziyang the successful experiences of the few 
institutes which had been involved, emphasizing effectiveness in the 
diffusion of results, demand-oriented research priorities and other fea- 
tures which became very prominent in the 1980s, encouraged reforms 
which were in almost direct opposition to the centralized planning 
philosophy of the militarists and the expansionist tendencies of the scien- 
tistic position. 
In December 1980 this economistic position was developed into a prag- 
matic program at the National Conference on Science and Technology 
Work. On the base of discussions at the Conference, the party committee 
at the SSTC drew up ))Outline Report on Policy concerning the Develop- 
ment of our National Science and Technologycr which was approved in 
April 1981 by the CCP Central Committee and the State Council. The Out- 
line summarized the future directions for science and technology policy in 
five major points: 
1. Science and technology was to be developed in coordination with soci- 
ety and economy with the primary mission of promoting economic de- 
velopment. 
2. Applied research on production technology and products was to be 
strengthened, shifting the balance towards a more useful structure of 
technological development. 
3. Research and development activities in production enterprises were to 
be stepped up. 
4. Basic research was to be guaranteed a position and to be expanded 
steadily, 
5. Imports of foreign technology was to be based on the national economic 
requirements. 
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In September 1982, at the Twelfth Party Congress, Hu Yaobang reiter- 
ated the axiom that science and technology was a key to the realization of 
the Four Modernizations. On October 24 in 1982 Zhao Ziyang addressed 
the National Conference for Scientific Awards, and here made an attempt 
to define more precisely the relationship between science, technology and 
economic development. He put forward the slogan that ))economic con- 
struction should rely on the development of science and technology, and 
they in return should be geared to the needs of economic construction.cr 
This slogan became a kind of programmatic base of Zhao Ziyang's efforts 
to wrest something useful out of the existing S&T system. 
An emphasis on the requirements of the economy served the economis- 
tic camp primarily as a political weapon to shoot down ill-advised, presti- 
geous projects in fields such as high- energy physics. The new directions 
occurred simultaneously with criticism of expensive and politically biased 
projects such as the Baoshan steelworks. The financial cutbacks on expen- 
sive accelerator projects was also much in the same vein as the disillusion 
over the actual weakness of China's economic strength. It was most con- 
troversial for people engaged in basic science, for instance the most emi- 
nent scientists in the Chinese Academy of Sciences. These scientists - the 
core of the scientistic lobby - remained antagonistic to reforms which 
stressed applied research and tangible, immediate results at the expense of 
basic research. 
There are reasons to believe that they were supported in this resistance 
to the reforms by Hu Yaobang, who had been President of the Academy 
during a short spell in the 1970s. At any rate, a new President of the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences, Lu Jiaxi, who was elected in 1981, was re- 
moved from his post in January 1987 when Hu Yaobang fell from power. 
This dismissal was probably a consequence of the backlash of political 
pursuasion which was intended to put an end to the demands expressed 
by dissidents such as Fang Lizhi, towards whom Lu Jiaxi was clearly per- 
ceived as being too indulgent. But for all the rhetoric concerning commit- 
ments to reform that were expressed by Lu Jiaxi in his speeches on the new 
role and organization of the CAS, it appears that he was never fond of put- 
ting such priorities into concrete action - a task which has to a large degree 
fallen on his successor Zhou Guangzhao. 
After the question of basic policy priorities had been settled in favour of 
what we might term mission-oriented research and development by the 
))draft outlinetr of 1981, there remained the problem of reforming the 
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management of S&T in order to put such priorities into action. In essence, 
there were two problems: firstly, resolving the inefficiency of centralized 
management of research and, secondly, finding alternative means of link- 
ing research with production. Management reform would require a more 
substantial dissociation from the Soviet model with all its inherent con- 
tradictions and alienation from the productive system. 
The ideas which were eventually endorsed by the CCP Central Commit- 
tee in its ))Decision on the Reform of the Science and Technology Manage- 
ment System(( of March 1985 were, to a large degree, a victory for the 
economistic position with its new radical program. These ideas reflect the 
belief of China's reformers that a fair dose of market forces would cure the 
ccplancr patient. Such ideas were inspired - literally, it turns out, through 
overseas Chinese scientists -by the liberalist image of the driving forces of 
innovation in the United States. It is likely that there was also a basic mis- 
understanding of the way in which science and technology had been uti- 
lized to boost economic development in Taiwan. 
The draft of the decision was compiled in its final version after a rather 
long period of discussion, both within and outside the party. In the end, 
the document contains a compromise between the economistic and the 
bureaucratic models. It confirmed the new concepts of technology as a 
commodity, the funding reforms, the need to strengthen industrial 
research, and the efforts to encourage mobility among researchers which 
had become the hallmark of the economistic approach. Simultaneously, 
however, there were several paragraphs indicating a significant reluctance 
against relaxing control over projects of national priority (including, of 
course, defence) which were the main concern of the bureaucratic ap- 
proach. Thus, in the course of reorganizing central administration, a call 
was issued for a strengthening of macro-management of science and tech- 
nology. 
The decision was adopted during a period when optimism still reigned 
concerning the results of economic reforms, particularly since the new 
agricultural policies had generated spectacular growth rates in the early 
1980s. This optimistic sentiment appears to have reduced direct opposi- 
tion in the Central Committee with regard to the more controversial ele- 
ments of the decision. We may also assume that the conflicts of interest 
which erupted between Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang, and eventually 
Zhao Ziyang about the extent and political consequences of reform were 
still dormant. 
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During the second half of the 1980s, however, we have witnessed a 
retreat from the market-oriented aspects of the decision. As the practical 
consequences of new, innovative forms of technology transfer and en- 
trepreneurship became apparent in 1986, brakes were applied by the cen- 
tral authorities. At the same time, the scaled-down eight-year plan for 
science and technology was completed, and the results were widely publi- 
cized, thus providing an opportunity for advanced research institutions 
such as the Chinese Academy of Science to lobby for new support. Prepa- 
rations for a new five-year plan with many high technology projects 
provided further impetus to the process of lobbying, and the distin- 
guished scientists of the academy and other institutions which were threa- 
tened by the funding reforms appears to have successfully persuaded 
Deng Xiaoping that such investments in advanced research were justified. 
Even Zhao Ziyang reluctantly postponed further cuts in operational 
budgets, one of the most controversial policy actions initiated under the re- 
forms. 
A typical example of the high-tech scientistic lobbyists' efforts to 
preserve large chunks of central support for their basic research was the 
publicity developed over experiments in superconductivity, which were 
announced with great enthusiasm in 1987. In terms of experimental 
results, the Chinese research on superconductivity was comparable to the 
most advanced Western and Japanese counterparts, although the practical 
commercialized applications seem nowhere in sight. In this event of sym- 
bolic significance for Chinese nationalism, strong pressures for support to 
institutions of advanced research were manifest and, judging from the ex- 
perience of recent years, this lobbying was basically successful. 
In the light of events since Spring 1989, it appears that, in addition to the 
scientistic lobbying, the economistic reforms had to face a severe militarist 
reaction to reforms which were gaining support after 1987, and that Pre- 
mier Li Peng has acted as the focal point of such resistance. In some of the 
few public statements which Li Peng has made since Zhao Ziyang was 
purged, the theme of reform has been toned down considerably. In this 
view, the reforms have ))basically been successfula - i.e. terminated - and 
there remain merely two issues to solve: one is the dilemma of serving the 
immediate needs of national economic construction or the long-term de- 
velopmental needs; the other is the relationship between basic and ap- 
plied research. In Li Peng's view, although the majority of efforts should go 
into applied research, there are elements of basic research which do not 
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provide immediate economic results but which cannot be ignored. 
To sum up this brief review of the political fate of S&T policy reforms of 
the 1980s, we would argue that once the conflicts of ideologist vs, neu- 
tralist positions were over, S&T policy developed in response to three basic 
philosophies - ))bureaucratic,(( ))scientistic,(( and ))economisticcc - which in- 
creasingly showed signs of being rooted in organizational or sectorial lob- 
bying. The economistic approach, which pushed reforms forwards in 
order to generate widespread innovation useful for China's economic de- 
velopment, made a bold attempt to follow up the decision of March 1985, 
but have been faced with outright resistance from the scientistic and 
gradually also from the bureaucratic camps, has reached the point where 
barriers to further reform seem impossible to surmount. The bureaucratic 
mode of S&T management, featuring only incremental changes in relation 
to the basically ineffective Soviet model, now appears to occupy the main 
theatre of S&T policy making. 
Money 
Reforms in the funding system have been the most important operational 
change introduced in recent years. The new funding system aims at in- 
troducing what the Chinese leadership terms ((economic levers( into 
science and technology management, in order to make effective use of 
research resources. 
The old funding system was based on fixed quotas. The central govern- 
ment controlled the allocation of annual operating budgets to indepen- 
dent research and development units under its jurisdiction, i,e,, above 
municipal and provincial levels. These allocations depended mostly on 
the type of institute supported, the size of its staff, etc. The quantity and 
quality of projects were generally not evaluated, neither was there any 
correlation between funding and performance in terms of economic or so- 
cial benefits. One gathers the impression that the old funding procedures 
paid little attention to the academic merits and feasibility of projects either, 
In short, research institutes appears to have been ineffective because they 
were never exposed to pressure in order to make their activities more 
responsive to economic and social demands. 
Linking the supply of funds to fulfilment of specific research tasks was 
therefore seen as the key to invigoration of the S&T system. Accordingly, 
the funding reform has shifted the sources of research money into three 
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different avenues: government contracts, contracts with industry, and 
funding from research foundations. 
The most important source of research funding remains government al- 
location, a total of 6.7 billion yuan which was almost two-thirds of the 11.4 
billion yuan spent during 1987 as R&D expenditure for civilian purposes in 
China.6 A system of bidding for government research contracts has 
presumably made the allocation procedures more competitive, and those 
who receive money are subject to more stringent control. 
Contracts with industry and other organizations have become the se- 
cond largest source of funding. Income from lateral linkages (as opposed 
to ))verticals source of income, i.e., allocations from the government) grew 
from 2.7 billion yuan in 1986 to 3.6 billion yuan in 1987.7 By the end of 1987, 
almost half of the institutes are said to have reduced the requirements for 
government funds, while 13 per cent were independent of operating funds 
from the government. Many research institutes under industrial minis- 
tries have cut 40 per cent of their state budget allocations. 
Funding of basic research and advanced applied research is increasingly 
supposed to take place through the science foundation. The origins of the 
foundation goes back to May 1981, when the CAS Academy Affairs Com- 
mittee suggested that a foundation should be set u p  in order to develop 
basic research. The CAS Foundation subsequently set up  with the ap- 
proval of the State Council provided funds amounting to 132 million yuan 
for 3246 projects from 1982 to 1984. After this experimental phase, the Na- 
tional Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) was established in 
February 1986. 
Government allocations are the main financial source of NSFC, 
although it also accepts donations from individuals and institutions at 
home and abroad. Everyone capable of engaging in and having conditions 
to do basic or applied research is free to apply for financial assistance. Ap- 
plications will be evaluated through peer review, and it is believed that this 
procedure will ensure that the best applications will be the first to receive 
support. In promoting the peer review system, the foundation is a new 
departure from China's hierarchical structures, where age and political 
clout have usually been decisive in determining who should get support. 
The reform of funding system naturally generates a lot of controversy. In 
particular, scientists from CAS were almost totally against the central deci- 
sion. They complained that the government was short-sighted and only 
wanted to get short-term benefits from technical development and serv- 
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ices instead of long-term scientific and technological advance. They ar- 
gued that reforming the funding system would destroy basic research and 
broaden the gap with advanced countries. 
A number of China's famous scientists who were trained abroad, and 
who are used to doing basic research geared to the forefront of interna- 
tional research, accordingly stepped up pressure on the government to 
keep their position in the international science and technology field. Thus 
these scientists managed to use their prestigious position to boost basic 
research. The 'Baliusan' High Technology Plan (Baliusan refers to March 
1986, when the plan was adopted) can thus be seen as a product of a com- 
promise between the Communist Party and the scientists in terms of re- 
form of the funding system, in order to meet the demand of scientists do- 
ing basic research. The 'Baliusan' plan includes almost all the advanced 
science and technology fields: bio-technology, aeronautic and space tech- 
nology, information technology, laser, automation technology, energy and 
new materials. The budget for this high technology adventure is report- 
edly around 10 billion yuan. Such expenditure is, however, negligible in in- 
ternational comparison and although there have been official press 
reports concerning the successful implementation of the plan, the 
prospects for large-scale economic benefits seem meagre. 
People 
Effective use of talented people is a pressing problem in the reform of the 
science and technology system in China. Deng Xiaoping has reportedly 
stated that d n  restructuring the economic system, what is most important 
and what I am most concerned about is talent, in restructuring the science 
and technology system, what I am most concerned about is still talent.(( 
Former premier Zhao Ziyang has also been a strong proponent of reforms 
that would increase the rational utilization of scientists and technicians.' 
The economistic camp has identified two major defects in China's present 
system of personnel management. The first problem is the lack of motiva- 
tion on part of many educated people created by the misallocation through 
the central administration of the assignment of graduates. The second pro- 
blem is that mnit ownership,(( i.e., the tendency of research units to hoard 
educated people regardless of how well suited they are for their particular 
assignments, creates strong imbalance in the sectorial and geographical 
distribution of scientists and engineers. 
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In the past, industrial and economic policies gave priority to providing 
qualified scientists, engineers and technicians to the military industry, fol- 
lowed by heavy industry and with light industry and agriculture trailing 
well behind. Therefore, among the 851.000 engineering and technical per- 
sonnel working in the industrial departments in 1978, only 14,5O/0 were em- 
ployed in the light industry while 85,5% were placed in the heavy industry. 
For every 10.000 S&T workers in China, only three work in agriculture. The 
entire agricultural system reportedly only has 441 senior agronomists, 
thus occupying 0,12% of the contingent of 36.000 agricultural scientists. 
There is evidently a need to transfer at least part of the personnel resources 
to sectors such as light industry and agriculture which are in dire need of 
technological change. 
In order to create a more even geographical distribution of manpower, 
the Chinese government have sought to provide some incentives for those 
people who were willing to be transferred to remote areas and to the coun- 
tryside. These incentives included higher wages, more holidays during 
the year, better living conditions, better schools for their children, or even 
offering to bring wife and husband together. Because of the strict Chinese 
residence register system, wife and husband often have to live in separate 
localities for a very long time, occasionally all their life, so that the latter in- 
centive would seem very beneficial to some people. People were also enti- 
tled to retain their urban registration and residence card and be guaran- 
teed that they can return to their original place of residence after a fixed 
period of time. 
Such incentives appear to have offered some attraction during the early 
years of reform. With the emergence of jobs in non-governmental insti- 
tutes, suburban town enterprises, and in particular administrative serv- 
ices, science and technology staff have been quick to realize that they can 
get better paid and receive more powerful jobs without having to go to 
such dreaded places as the frontier areas or the countryside. Accordingly, 
as the reforms causing a somewhat more market-oriented mobility of 
qualified people have gained ground, the incentives set up by the govern- 
ment do not achieve much any more. Table 1 shows a matrix of the ge- 
ographical distribution of personnel flow, and clearly indicates that move- 
ment is still away from the inland or remote areas towards the coastal 
region. 
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Table 1. Matrix of S&T Personnel Flow (1984-1987) 
From To 
Coastal Inland Remote 
region region areas 
Coastal region 15,365 5,967 1,062 
Inland region 27,106 15,543 3,108 
Remote area 15,799 11,411 2,070 
Source: Keji rentjuan liudong taishi baogao (Beijing: Mimeo, May 1988). 
In terms of sectorial distribution, the record appears to be equally disap- 
pointing. Table 2 shows that the actual direction of personnel flow is 
largely inconsistent with the alleged goals of the reform. People seem to 
leave state-run institutes, universities and large-scale enterprises in great 
numbers only to find employment in other governmental organizations. 
Generally, few qualified S&T staff wish to find employment in non- 
government units because such employment is full of uncertainties. 
Table 2 ,  Trend of S&T Personnel Flow 
(No. of people, percentage of total S&T Staff) 
1984 1985 1986 
out % out % out % 
Research 
Institutes 17,000 3.27 22,300 4.14 15,400 2.13 
Institutions 
of Higher Education 11,400 2.43 12,300 2.46 9,700 183 
Large and 
Medium-sized 
Enterprises 70,200 2.63 70,500 2,54 51,100 1.76 
Total 98,700 2.70 105,200 2.76 76,400 1.90 
Source: Keji reyuan liudong taishi baogao. 
We may conclude that, in contrast to the stated objectives of the econo- 
mistic model regarding labour mobility for S&T staff, the actual migration 
patterns are characterized by the following features: 
1. A large number of S&T personnel leave large and medium- sized enter- 
prises, more than those who leave research institutes or universities. 
2. A high proportion of the flow is away from remote areas. 
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3. Few qualified S&T personnel wish to leave permanently for a job in non- 
governmental enterprises. 
These trends reflect the fact that risk-aversion and a search for the most 
prestigeous places to work are still the actual core of job mobility incentives 
in China. The bureaucratic camp has reacted to this contradiction by a re- 
establishment of more stringent administrative job allocation measures. 
The situation by the end of the 1980s was again in a deadlock. 
For people already with permanent posts the situation may be alleviated 
by spare-time or part-time work, i.e. ((Moonlighting((. For intellectuals the 
new opportunities to develop prosperous side-line activities may have 
been the most gratifying new dimension introduced into China's employ- 
ment practice. The basic concern about spare-time employment has been 
how to provide adequate material incentives to scientists and engineers 
while limiting their earnings in order to avoid jealousy from their col- 
leagues and party cadres. In fact, such cjealousycc has caused trouble for 
many people with spare-time jobs. Several cases have been announced 
where people engaged in spare-time work were accused of economic 
crimes and of stealing research materials. 
In order to create more precise guidelines, the SSTC issued a circular in 
June 1985 which stated that ))we shall permit science and technology per- 
sonnel to take on proper concurrent work or after-hours intellectual work, 
so that the potential that we have in our scientific and technical personnel 
is brought into full play.(( Meanwhile, institute directors were advised to 
make some important distinctions: 1) a distinction between people who 
complete their primary task and those who ccunscrupulously neglect their 
primary work to seek personal profit elsewhere((; 2) a distinction between 
people who accept contracts with the prior approval of their principal em- 
ployers and those who ))simply run off without taking leave and grab extra 
income by hook or by crook. cc 
To the outsider, this simply suggests that crooks in the S&T institutions 
should be kept at bay, but of course in actual practice leaving the judge- 
ment of ))healthiness(( of such activities to institute directors has tended to 
make spare- time work more difficult. In addition, public authorities were 
becoming interested in these activities, and the taxation rate on income 
from spare-time work has, for instance, been raised on three occasions in 
Shanghai. 
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Controversial Enterpreneurship 
Entrepreneurship, in the form of leaving one's unit in order to set up a new 
firm, is probably the most radical approach to the problems created by the 
old S&T system. It is by no means an easy decision, since a departure from 
the safety of permanent posts, housing schemes, etc. entails substantial 
risk. Entrepreneurs everywhere in the world face such risks and barriers 
and, in many ways, Chinese entrepreneurs resemble their colleagues in 
other countries in terms of social marginalization. In the past, it was virtu- 
ally unthinkable that a Chinese scientist would become a businessman. 
The Chinese leadership seemed, however, committed to supporting 
such entrepreneurship, and made a point of encouraging experimental 
forms of new technology-based enterprises in the Decision of March 1985. 
As we shall see below, a substantial number of people responded posi- 
tively to this high-level support; many institutes also decided to jump into 
some form of collective entrepreneurship by establishing new companies. 
The most well-known site for such entrepreneurship is the c(E1ectronics 
Streek (dianzi jie) in the Zhongguancun area of the northwestern suburbs 
of Beijingqg This area, which is also the site of many advanced research in- 
stitutes in China, has become the breeding ground for a large number of 
so-called S&T firms (keji qiye), including several which have won fame at 
home as well as abroad, such as the Stone Computer Company. 
The fate of the Electronics Street and its entrepreneurial spirit is, in many 
ways, symptomatic of the way in which reform has proceeded in China. 
Most of the firms in the area were set up during the ))overheated(( days of 
1984-85 and have flourished since with annual growth rates of more than 
100 per cent. They became the focus of controversy in 1987, when it became 
clear that these firms were far more effective - at least in terms of making 
profit - than most state-operated units. A major investigation was then car- 
ried out in early 1988 at the initiative of leading members of the CCP Cen- 
tral Committee. The report from this investigation seems to have settled 
the doubts which people like Zhao Ziyang may have had regarding how 
))healthy(( the firms were, although more conservative adherents of the 
scientistic and militarist outlook certainly retained their scepticism. 
In spite of the apparent peace concluded with the bureaucratic sceptics 
within the party and among higher authorities, mistrust nevertheless con- 
tinued to exist in many quarters of society. The success of the products and 
services which these firms offered to the market remained, in the eyes of 
many, a mere expression of salesmanship rather than their technological 
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level. In addition to the contempt towards such commercial flair which is 
a distinctive feature of both traditional Chinese Confucian values and 
more recent Communist dogmatism, there was a fear of the political con- 
sequences of private enterprise. There was an enfant terrible buried some- 
where in most of the entrepreneurs of the Electronics Street, and for some 
it became a political cause to defend the liberty just acquired. A spectacu- 
lar climax of this political challenge was when the President of the Stone 
Group Corporation, Wan Runnan, came to the support of student demon- 
strators in Spring 1989, and had to escape to the United States and France 
after the crackdown. 
Big Business 
The history of new technology firms in the Electronics Street dates back to 
a ))Service Department for the Development of Advanced Technologycc 
which had been created in 1980 by a group at the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences, led by Chen Chunxian from the Institute of Physics. Inspired by 
visits to the Silicon Valley and Route 128 in the US, this bureau was an at- 
tempt to combine R&D with production. Chen Chunxian's initiative was 
discussed by Hu Yaobang and other members of the CCP Central Commit- 
tee in January 1983, whose conclusion was an approval of the ))new road 
taken.(( In April 1983, an independent unit was formed under the name 
nHuaxia New Technology Development Institute.(( 
A large number of new firms were set up in the following years, and pi- 
oneers such as Chen Chunxian's outfit became small in the shade of a core 
group of very prosperous companies. By 1987, eight companies led by 
newcomer ))Stone(( had captured most of the market for micro-computers 
in China, recording a combined annual turnover of 680 million yuan 
(RMB) . 
Table 3. Electronics Street: Number of Firms and Turnover 
No. of firms 11 40 90 n.a. 148 
Turnover 
(mill. yuan) n.a. 18 140 350 900 
Source: Xiwang de huoguang (1988). 
The most conspicuous aspect of the firms in Electronics Street is their ex- 
plosive growth in sales. The turnover of firms in that area rose from 18 
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million yuan in 1984 to over 900 million yuan in 1987, constituting more than 
a third of the total social income of the Haidian district. The turnover rose 
at a much faster rate than the number of firms, as shown in table 3 above. 
Almost half of the 148 firms are established or associated directly with 
the Chinese Academy of Sciences or its institutes. Nearly a third belong to 
organizations of the Haidian district, while the remaining 20 per cent have 
been established by ministries, universities or the municipal authorities. 
More than two-thirds of the firms are collectively owned, some with par- 
ticipation by state-owned units while other firms are genuinely run by the 
local people (minban). More than 20 percent are actually set up and 
financed by state-owned units, which affect their management style con- 
siderably. Private entrepreneurship at the Electronics Street has caught the 
attention of many observers both within and outside China, but with 
limited access to sources of capital outside the realm of state-operated units 
it is no wonder that few firms boast of their independence from direct in- 
tervention by some authority of the central or local government. 
The difference between firms run by local people and those run by state- 
owned units is that the former are more profitable, but still manage to pay 
less tax. The table below indicates that the firms run by the local people 
tend to require less investment and reap higher profits per invested yuan 
than those which are run by the Chinese Academy of Sciences. 
Table 4. Firms Run by the People and by the Academy: A Comparison of 
Performance (yuan). 
Firms run by Firms run by 
the people the academy 
Initial investment 5,900,000 9,900,000 
Number of employees 1,914 556 
Turnover per employee 355,000 324,000 
Profit per employee 28,200 36,700 
Tax paid per employee 11,400 45,600 
Accumulated fixed assets 13,800 25,200 
Profit per invested yuan 9.15 2.06 
Tax per invested yuan 3.69 2.56 
Fixed assets per invested yuan 4.46 1.41 
Source: Xiwang de huoguang, p. 48. 
The economic achievements of the entrepreneurial firms - the vast 
majority of which have been spin-off activities of the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences - have been remarkable in the light of the aloofness generally as- 
sociated with researchers from the Academy. It has been argued that 
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this aspect is particularly noteworthy for research institutes normally 
working under the industrial ministries which, in principle, should be 
even better qualified to set up such firms. The explanation seems to lie in 
some kind of overseas experience. For example, Wan Runnan, the founder 
and now former director of the Stone Corporation, had studied in the 
United States and obviously received many new ideas from that visit. 
Technological or Mercantile Entrepreneurship 
There have been plenty of grievances from scientists - particularly in the 
academy - that these firms were not really engaged in technological de- 
velopment, but only engaged in marketing of high-tech products from 
abroad. In other words, the entrepreneurs of the Electronics Street were 
denounced as clever salesmen. The implication is, of course, that such 
mercantile entrepreneurship is demeaning for an intellectual; one can 
sense the presence of a revoked ghost from the traditional attitudes of the 
Chinese intellectual elite. In addition, however, the profitability of en- 
trepreneurship in Zhongguancun had also come up  against a more recent 
dogma in Chinese society - the ))red eyetr disease of jealousy of the 
wealthy. 
Table 5. Breakdown of Income for Firms in Electronics Street (thousand 
yuan, per cent) 
Year Technical Production Marketing Total 
Services 
1984 7627 1310 26918 35890 
(21.3%) (3.6%) (75.0%) 
1985 27110 8432 81506 117107 
(23.1%) (7.2%) (69.6%) 
1986 5113 2785 13859 21757 
Jan-Mar (23.5%) (12.8%) (63.7%) 
Note: Statistics based on 31, 109, and 68 firms in 1984, 1985, and 1986 respectively. 
Source: Xiwang de huoguang, p. 129. 
To a large extent the allegation that the entrepreneurs had achieved more 
in terms of salesmanship than in terms of technological innovation is cor- 
rect. Table 5 shows that in 1984 75 % of the firms' income came from mar- 
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keting. During 1985-86 this share has declined, and more income is now 
based on the firms' own products, which presumably include indigenous 
design. Nevertheless, the income related directly to technical consulting, 
etc. still occupies approximately one quarter. 
Conclusion 
In this paper we have tried to set up a very simplified scheme of labelling 
different political outlooks on China's science and technology policy. This 
was done mainly in order to investigate and understand the fate of the re- 
forms which have been introduced during the 1980s. Our interpretation is 
that these reforms have been undermined both by the emergence of a wide 
range of side-effects and - more importantly, in our view - by the lobbying 
of vested interests in the   old^ system, i.e. the scientists and the military- 
state establishment, 
The reform of the funding system has, in our view, been fairly successful 
in terms of broadening the range of financial resources for S&T and in 
providing an impetus for research institutes to seek research and develop- 
ment tasks which are potentially interesting to customers in the govern- 
ment and industrial enterprises. There has been a limit to how far one 
could go in this direction, however, and the criticism mounted by scientists 
against the full-blown implications of the teform during the late 1980s was 
largely effective in bringing the process to a standstill. The new diversity of 
funding sources has brought new possibilities for Chinese scientists to set 
autonomous priorities. Whether the present leadership is willing to accept 
this diversity in the long run remains an open question. 
The attempt to improve the utilization of scientific and technical talent by 
larger mobility does not appear to have resulted in the kinds of flow of peo- 
ple that the government wanted to promote in the first place. Conse- 
quently, there has been a great number of difficulties in implementing the 
reform, and the effects which would have come about have largely been 
foregone. 
The most successful result of reform has, in our view, been the en- 
couragement of technological entrepreneurship. The irony of it is that the 
current leadership finds it extremely difficult to accept the implications of 
this success. The scepticism of bureaucracy towards the new-fangled elec- 
tronics firms in Zhongguancun was temporarily put to rest after an investi- 
gation in 1987-88. But the active role of many entrepreneurs - and in partic- 
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